My wife brought home the most recent edition of Jewish Action (not available online yet) yesterday. In it there is a debate over the Orthodox position on evolution and intelligent design. Despite not being an area I'm especially knowledgeable about, I decided to take a look. The articles are pretty interesting, but I feel Nathan Aviezer's article explaining why ID is not a required Orthodox belief to have been the most compelling.
On the Shabbos before I got married I asked my cousin (who is a physics professor at NYU) whether he felt ID was science. His answer was simple: science is about explaining the world through natural means. ID presupposes (and actually bases itself on the idea) that certain organisms could not have evolved and therefore had to have been created by a designer, who designed (at the very least) those organisms though supernatural means. Moreover by assuming that those organisms originated via supernatural mechanisms, ID forecloses further scientific study into their origins.
Science cannot accept these conclusions. Supernatural explanations have no place in science; and proposing that certain areas no longer be open to study is anathema to the scientific enterprise. ID is a perfectly valid theological proposition, but it is no more science than the idea that demons cause disease.
Aviezer makes similar points, but adds to the argument. To assume that G-d can only be found in the "gaps," which are areas we cannot currently explain, pushes G-d to constantly retreat as science catches up. Every day we learn more and more about the world, and there's no reason to assume we won't figure out how every organism evolved. What happens then? Should we be limiting G-d to a tiny corner of science?
He supports the idea of guided evolution, based on the idea that the probability of the universe coming about as it did is almost nil. He posits that the anthropic principle supports the theory that something must have intervened to create the universe and that it's reasonable to believe that there was a designer who ensured everything fell into place in order that life could be sustained in our universe.
I don't find it surprising that a publication of the OU (whose head wrote a forward to Slifkin's new book) was willing to publish ideas that run contrary to contemporary charedi hashkafa. I commend them for doing so and allowing Aviezer to explain simply why evolution and Judaism are not in conflict.
Wednesday, August 30, 2006
Thursday, August 24, 2006
What? How Did This Happen?
Apparently Pluto was demoted today to a "dwarf planet." Maybe I haven't been paying attention but this just came out of nowhere. Poor Pluto, it was good to know you.
Sunday, August 20, 2006
Consent, The Shavuos, And Land For Peace
My last post dealt with an obstacle to those who argue that the Ramban/Minchat Chinuch deny Israel the discretion of whether to trade land for peace. Basically I argued that the Ramban clearly (Mitzvot Lo Taase 17) requires consultation and acquiescence with the Urim Vetumim and since it is no longer operative, no milchemet mitzvah for the purpose of capturing or retaining land can be undertaken.
In this post I'd like to deal with another response to the milchemet mitzvah argument. My thesis is based on Rabbi Bleich's position and is not entirely my own, but some is, to my knowledge, original. Any flaws in those arguments should not be attributed to Rabbi Bleich.
It is well known that the plain reading of the Ramban affirms that the mitzvah of settling Israel is required even today. Rabbi Bleich however argues that the Three Oaths negate the other half of the obligation, which is to capture the land. As he puts it, if the Oaths mean anything they must mean at the very least that Israel cannot capture land by force. A similar argument is made by the Megillat Esther, that the requirement to capture the land is only in force when we are not subjugated by the nations.
I spoke to Rabbi Bleich about this argument and mentioned that if the Oaths have the force to prevent Israel from having to embark on a milchemet mitzvah, why wouldn't they prohibit the original capture of land in 1948 (or even earlier)? Taken to their logical conclusion, the Oaths should prohibit the State of Israel completely. His answer, from what I could ascertain, is that the consent of the world mitigated the force of the Oaths and allowed the Jews to settle there. He noted that the Ohr Sameiach made the consent argument. (Others also proffered this argument). While the consent allowed the Jews to create a state in 1948, it did not require them to fight to defend any land captured subsequently. In other words, the Oaths did not apply then, but they apply today, and therefore the obligation to capture the land is suspended.
Thinking about it later I realized that the argument seems flawed. If consent allowed Israel to capture land in 1948, why shouldn't that same consent mitigate the Oaths today, therefore reinstating the obligation to wage war to capture Eretz Yisroel? What was so unique about that consent that it could suffice before the State was created but is nonapplicable today?
To summarize, the argument seems to go like this: The Oaths are binding as a halachic matter (I realize this argument is controversial and for some responses see Gil's translation of Rabbi Aviner's Shelo Yaalu Choma). They negate the communal requirement to capture the land according to the Ramban. Therefore as long as the Oaths are in effect, there is no obligation to retain land if transferring it will save lives. The Oaths were not in effect from the initial settlement after the Balfour Declaration (because of the sovereign's consent) but are in effect today. My question is: why?
I think the answer lies within a complex web of facts and law. First, it's important to understand what exactly has to occur for consent to negate the Oaths. According to the Maharsha, "building the wall" is allowed if done with the permission of the king. It's unlikely that the Maharsha truly meant to limit this concept to a king, and he probably meant the permission of the sovereign (The Ramban makes this point in regard to the obligation for a king to wage a milchemet mitzvah where he expands the concept to whomever is ruling the country at the time; see mitzvah 4 in the mitzvot our master forgot).
Who was the sovereign in 1919? The world as constituted in the League of Nations. It's important to remember that in San Remo in 1922, when the League of Nations created the Mandate for Palestine, sovereignty remained in the League and not in the British Crown. The British were merely administrators and did not have full sovereign rights over the territory (although they of course had some of the powers usually associated with the sovereign). At that conference, in a document that became public international law, the Mandate was designed to facilitate
It seems unlikely that the Oaths denied the Jews the right to defend territory already granted to them by the sovereign. If one wanted to take over Israel when the Romans controlled it, he'd have to face the Roman army, not the people. The people simply had no legal existence as sovereigns and are not relevant to the discussion.
As a matter of law and Halacha, the sovereign was the League or the UN until 1948. Those bodies consented to Jewish sovereignty. The response by the inhabitants is conceptually no different than if 50 years later Brazilian citizens came to Israel and attacked. Once consent was granted, Israel could be created. The response of the natives was aggression and Halacha and international law recognizes the Jews right to respond in self-defense. In other words, we are dealing with two distinct time frames: 1) the sovereign (king in the parlance of the Maharsha) grants the Jews the right to build the state and 2) the inhabitants attack. The Oath was already suspended by the time the Arabs attacked and that attack is halachically irrelevant to mitigate the suspension.
Getting back to my earlier point, consent sufficed to allow Israel to capture a degree of land (up to the 1949 borders). Did that consent extend to the West Bank and Gaza? I doubt it. Although one can argue that the Mandate still applies today because no country has been (legally) sovereign in those areas since 1949, that argument ignores the ascent of the norm of self-determination as a bedrock principle in international law. The people who live there are relevant and certainly have NOT consented to Israel taking over the West Bank and Gaza.
It would seem therefore that the Oaths currently do apply in those areas since Israel lacks the consent of the sovereign (who are the people), and concurrently the obligation to conquer the land is suspended. However at the very least some of the land they controlled in 1949 was captured in accordance with the Ramban's position and Israel would be obligated to fight to retain it. How much of that land depends on what type of consent was obtained and over how much territory. The rest of the land Israel controls it can retain because the land is necessary to defend the country from its enemies even if an active fight for the land is prohibited. Israel can keep the land for instrumentalist reasons: as a corollary of the requirement to defend Jews from their enemies, which the Rambam brings down as a basis for a milchemet mitzvah.
I'd appreciate comments from both a halachic and legal perspective.
In this post I'd like to deal with another response to the milchemet mitzvah argument. My thesis is based on Rabbi Bleich's position and is not entirely my own, but some is, to my knowledge, original. Any flaws in those arguments should not be attributed to Rabbi Bleich.
It is well known that the plain reading of the Ramban affirms that the mitzvah of settling Israel is required even today. Rabbi Bleich however argues that the Three Oaths negate the other half of the obligation, which is to capture the land. As he puts it, if the Oaths mean anything they must mean at the very least that Israel cannot capture land by force. A similar argument is made by the Megillat Esther, that the requirement to capture the land is only in force when we are not subjugated by the nations.
I spoke to Rabbi Bleich about this argument and mentioned that if the Oaths have the force to prevent Israel from having to embark on a milchemet mitzvah, why wouldn't they prohibit the original capture of land in 1948 (or even earlier)? Taken to their logical conclusion, the Oaths should prohibit the State of Israel completely. His answer, from what I could ascertain, is that the consent of the world mitigated the force of the Oaths and allowed the Jews to settle there. He noted that the Ohr Sameiach made the consent argument. (Others also proffered this argument). While the consent allowed the Jews to create a state in 1948, it did not require them to fight to defend any land captured subsequently. In other words, the Oaths did not apply then, but they apply today, and therefore the obligation to capture the land is suspended.
Thinking about it later I realized that the argument seems flawed. If consent allowed Israel to capture land in 1948, why shouldn't that same consent mitigate the Oaths today, therefore reinstating the obligation to wage war to capture Eretz Yisroel? What was so unique about that consent that it could suffice before the State was created but is nonapplicable today?
To summarize, the argument seems to go like this: The Oaths are binding as a halachic matter (I realize this argument is controversial and for some responses see Gil's translation of Rabbi Aviner's Shelo Yaalu Choma). They negate the communal requirement to capture the land according to the Ramban. Therefore as long as the Oaths are in effect, there is no obligation to retain land if transferring it will save lives. The Oaths were not in effect from the initial settlement after the Balfour Declaration (because of the sovereign's consent) but are in effect today. My question is: why?
I think the answer lies within a complex web of facts and law. First, it's important to understand what exactly has to occur for consent to negate the Oaths. According to the Maharsha, "building the wall" is allowed if done with the permission of the king. It's unlikely that the Maharsha truly meant to limit this concept to a king, and he probably meant the permission of the sovereign (The Ramban makes this point in regard to the obligation for a king to wage a milchemet mitzvah where he expands the concept to whomever is ruling the country at the time; see mitzvah 4 in the mitzvot our master forgot).
Who was the sovereign in 1919? The world as constituted in the League of Nations. It's important to remember that in San Remo in 1922, when the League of Nations created the Mandate for Palestine, sovereignty remained in the League and not in the British Crown. The British were merely administrators and did not have full sovereign rights over the territory (although they of course had some of the powers usually associated with the sovereign). At that conference, in a document that became public international law, the Mandate was designed to facilitate
the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine....
Contrary to the assertions of Frumteens a National Home is a State. But one thing Frumteens is right about: the Mandate did not support a Jewish State in all of Palestine, but only in part of it. It did not deny the possibility, but did not agree to help establish a sovereign state for the Jews throughout the entire Mandate. In other words, the consent of the sovereign in this case allowed the Jews to settle all of Palestine, and in theory to make it a Jewish State in its entirety. But if the Arabs decided to establish sovereignty in parts of the Palestine, the Mandate would have no objection.
The Jews settled the land and obtained sovereignty on May 14, 1948. Prior to then the British returned the Mandate to the League's successor, the United Nations. The UN, as we all know,
voted to partition the Mandate into two separate states. Although 181 is nonbinding, it could be viewed as consent for the Jews to be sovereign over the parts laid out in the Partition Plan. The next year, on May 11, Israel was admitted to the UN. While it's is unclear if the UN recognized Israel's right to the land is captured outside of the partition plan's boundaries, it certainly consented to Israel's right to some of the land. At the very least there was implicit consent over Israel's right to control a part of the land.
Ah, but Frumteens argues, who cares about consent? The whole issue is that the Jews cannot "ascend like a wall", meaning they can only become sovereign if they take Palestine peacefully and unopposed. Since that clearly did not happen (witness all the riots, intifadas, and of course wars), the Jews still violated the Oaths. Consent of the world means nothing because
[t]here was a war - the war of '48, where 6,0000 Jews were killed. The Arabs, who were living in and around the land, did not give the Jews any permission to take it. Other countries did, and there is no such halachic status that the UN is like some kind of Sanhedrin Hagadol that can bind other nations to its decisions (any Zionist can tell you that). In any case, there is no comparison to a Coresh or any other "peaceful ascent", since - hello!! - in order to create the State of Israel they had to fight a bloody war with the Arabs!!!. So why in the world is that called a "peaceful ascent"?Frumteens' argument has no basis in Halacha, law, or politics. Put simply (and correct me if I'm wrong) Halacha considers the sovereign the person in charge, not the people who lived in the area. For the most part international law in 1922 (and probably in 1947) did not recognize it either. The concept of self-determination was nascent and not a norm of international law.
It seems unlikely that the Oaths denied the Jews the right to defend territory already granted to them by the sovereign. If one wanted to take over Israel when the Romans controlled it, he'd have to face the Roman army, not the people. The people simply had no legal existence as sovereigns and are not relevant to the discussion.
As a matter of law and Halacha, the sovereign was the League or the UN until 1948. Those bodies consented to Jewish sovereignty. The response by the inhabitants is conceptually no different than if 50 years later Brazilian citizens came to Israel and attacked. Once consent was granted, Israel could be created. The response of the natives was aggression and Halacha and international law recognizes the Jews right to respond in self-defense. In other words, we are dealing with two distinct time frames: 1) the sovereign (king in the parlance of the Maharsha) grants the Jews the right to build the state and 2) the inhabitants attack. The Oath was already suspended by the time the Arabs attacked and that attack is halachically irrelevant to mitigate the suspension.
Getting back to my earlier point, consent sufficed to allow Israel to capture a degree of land (up to the 1949 borders). Did that consent extend to the West Bank and Gaza? I doubt it. Although one can argue that the Mandate still applies today because no country has been (legally) sovereign in those areas since 1949, that argument ignores the ascent of the norm of self-determination as a bedrock principle in international law. The people who live there are relevant and certainly have NOT consented to Israel taking over the West Bank and Gaza.
It would seem therefore that the Oaths currently do apply in those areas since Israel lacks the consent of the sovereign (who are the people), and concurrently the obligation to conquer the land is suspended. However at the very least some of the land they controlled in 1949 was captured in accordance with the Ramban's position and Israel would be obligated to fight to retain it. How much of that land depends on what type of consent was obtained and over how much territory. The rest of the land Israel controls it can retain because the land is necessary to defend the country from its enemies even if an active fight for the land is prohibited. Israel can keep the land for instrumentalist reasons: as a corollary of the requirement to defend Jews from their enemies, which the Rambam brings down as a basis for a milchemet mitzvah.
I'd appreciate comments from both a halachic and legal perspective.
Friday, August 18, 2006
World Trade Center: A Movie Worth Seeing
A few night ago I went to see WTC. A harrowing movie on par with (although not as good as) United 93, the movie was the story of the last two rescue workers removed from the rubble. It featured the head of a Transit Authority unit and one of his patrolman who were about to enter Tower 2 before it collapsed, but never made it and instead were buried for almost a day.
The movie intersperses their plight with how their families react while they wait, and wait, and wait. I can't imagine what it must have been like to know they went into the towers and then not hear from them. Hope and faith were their only options.
My biggest quibble is that the stories of the these two men are limited in nature. We never saw any planes crash or even the buildings collapse (although we definitely heard them). We did hear constant crashes and explosions while they were about to go into the building, which was most likely people landing on Tower 5. But we never got to experience the complete package (the people jumping, the planes crashing, the people fleeing, the buildings collapsing, etc.). While we've all seen these scenes before, I'd love to have seen how the people at the time reacted to them.
There is also the story of a former marine who decides to just leave his accounting job, put on his uniform and head down to Ground Zero to save people. We meet another marine (who in a mistake that cannot be attributed to Stone was white in the movie but is black) who just happened to be there searching. We also meet a former medic who spent years in rehab, but that day just decided to do whatever he could to help. We have firemen begging to be allowed into the site to search, willing to bare the risks, simply because their friends were dying there.
These stories are the moral of the movie. The movie makes it clear: 9/11 showed us the evil man can perpetrate, but it also showed us the good. The selflessness, the altruism, and willingness to take risks for people they've never met, and in many cases when it wasn't even their duty to do so. That's the lesson we should take from movies like WTC.
The movie intersperses their plight with how their families react while they wait, and wait, and wait. I can't imagine what it must have been like to know they went into the towers and then not hear from them. Hope and faith were their only options.
My biggest quibble is that the stories of the these two men are limited in nature. We never saw any planes crash or even the buildings collapse (although we definitely heard them). We did hear constant crashes and explosions while they were about to go into the building, which was most likely people landing on Tower 5. But we never got to experience the complete package (the people jumping, the planes crashing, the people fleeing, the buildings collapsing, etc.). While we've all seen these scenes before, I'd love to have seen how the people at the time reacted to them.
There is also the story of a former marine who decides to just leave his accounting job, put on his uniform and head down to Ground Zero to save people. We meet another marine (who in a mistake that cannot be attributed to Stone was white in the movie but is black) who just happened to be there searching. We also meet a former medic who spent years in rehab, but that day just decided to do whatever he could to help. We have firemen begging to be allowed into the site to search, willing to bare the risks, simply because their friends were dying there.
These stories are the moral of the movie. The movie makes it clear: 9/11 showed us the evil man can perpetrate, but it also showed us the good. The selflessness, the altruism, and willingness to take risks for people they've never met, and in many cases when it wasn't even their duty to do so. That's the lesson we should take from movies like WTC.
Monday, August 14, 2006
Seems Like It's Over (For Now)
As of this morning, the fighting between Israel and Hizbollah ended. My thoughts:
1) The war was executed poorly, which is probably directly related to the fact neither Olmert or Peretz have any real military experience. Putting Peretz in charge of defense was probably the worst thing Olmert did when he took power. Coupled with Halutz's insistence to try air power (not surprising given his previous position as head of the air force) and the ground war was executed way too late. Israel had to know they'd only have a limited amount of time to execute their objectives and they waited way too long to go about them.
2) Only in the Arab world could a victory be the lack of total defeat. Going back to 73 when the Egyptians proclaimed victory because they weren't beaten in six days, it continued through the ntifada and until today Hizbollah when claimed a big victory. Come on, they spent the last month complaining how Israel was bombing them back to the stone age, and now they are claiming victory? How is the almost complete dessimation of the infrastructure of the southern part of your country consistent with victory?
Obviously Israel did win this war either. There is no way, given the current realities, that Israel could "defeat" Lebanon, but the objective was to destroy or seriously weaken Hizbollah. That didn't happen and hundreds of lives were lost and billions of shekels of damage was caused by the daily bombardment of Haifa and the north. Israel obviously came out on the better end in any objective metric, but the IDF needed to do more to ensure Hizbollah is no longer a great threat and that didn't happen.
3) I don't like Resolution 1701, but I basically agree with Barry Rubin that in theory it's not bad but won't be enforced because no one will dismantle or disarm Hizbollah. The whole hinges on which countries will constitute the new (and we hope improved) UNIFIL and whether those countries will do anything to stop the inevitable Hizbollah violations. If they can keep Hizbollah out of the south, that will minimize conflict and probably keep a very fragile ceasefire in place for a while. It's amazing that we can't get a resolution calling for someone relevant to disarm Hizbollah, but in practice who would carry that out? This whole situation sucks.
1) The war was executed poorly, which is probably directly related to the fact neither Olmert or Peretz have any real military experience. Putting Peretz in charge of defense was probably the worst thing Olmert did when he took power. Coupled with Halutz's insistence to try air power (not surprising given his previous position as head of the air force) and the ground war was executed way too late. Israel had to know they'd only have a limited amount of time to execute their objectives and they waited way too long to go about them.
2) Only in the Arab world could a victory be the lack of total defeat. Going back to 73 when the Egyptians proclaimed victory because they weren't beaten in six days, it continued through the ntifada and until today Hizbollah when claimed a big victory. Come on, they spent the last month complaining how Israel was bombing them back to the stone age, and now they are claiming victory? How is the almost complete dessimation of the infrastructure of the southern part of your country consistent with victory?
Obviously Israel did win this war either. There is no way, given the current realities, that Israel could "defeat" Lebanon, but the objective was to destroy or seriously weaken Hizbollah. That didn't happen and hundreds of lives were lost and billions of shekels of damage was caused by the daily bombardment of Haifa and the north. Israel obviously came out on the better end in any objective metric, but the IDF needed to do more to ensure Hizbollah is no longer a great threat and that didn't happen.
3) I don't like Resolution 1701, but I basically agree with Barry Rubin that in theory it's not bad but won't be enforced because no one will dismantle or disarm Hizbollah. The whole hinges on which countries will constitute the new (and we hope improved) UNIFIL and whether those countries will do anything to stop the inevitable Hizbollah violations. If they can keep Hizbollah out of the south, that will minimize conflict and probably keep a very fragile ceasefire in place for a while. It's amazing that we can't get a resolution calling for someone relevant to disarm Hizbollah, but in practice who would carry that out? This whole situation sucks.
Friday, August 11, 2006
A Question On Land For Peace
Maybe Chardal, Bluke and the other experts on Zionism issues can help me here.
I don't understand why the majority of the religious Zionist world opposes land for peace (ideologically). Let's assume for a moment that it's a virtual certainty that withdrawing from parts of the Judea and Shomron would lead to saving more lives than remaining in the territories. In other words the aggregate number of lives would be increased if Israel withdraws from land. Why can't Israel withdraw?
From what I understand the prohibition stems from "lo techanaim," which prohibits, among other things, giving non-Jews a stronghold in the land. Now I see no reason why pekuach nefesh would not trump this negative commandment, as it trumps every other positive or negative commandment save idolatry, murder and sexual promiscuity.
When I was in YU Rav Herschel Schacter used to propose a different ground. The Minchat Chinuch poses a question: why doesn't pekuach nefesh supersede the obligation to go to war? He answers that the nature of war is that lives are put at risk and therefore the obligation to go to war is greater than "v'cahi bahem." Therefore Rav Schacter argued that Israel must fight a war and assume causalities and can only cede land if they feel they won't win the war (in other words if the casualty rate is too high). That question is decided by the experts although regarding the disengagement question he argued that the decision should be made by believing Jews as a substitute for the Sanhedrin.
If I remember correctly, Chardal in the past argued that he'd only allow surrender of territory if the existence of the klal was at stake (like R' Yochanan). But what is the reasoning behind this position?
I think one could fairly argue that most of Israel's wars were in the category of milchemet mitzva. The Rambam lists the wars which fall under the category in Hilchot Melachim (5:1)
However, it is clear that defending Israel from its enemies is a milchemet mitzvah that even the Ramban would not require permission from the Urim Vetumim. Rabbi J. David Bleich in the third volume of Contemporary Halachic Problems mentions that the Gemara in Eruvin 45a allows defending border towns in Israel even on Shabbos. He argues that since at the time of the Gemara, Israel had no access to the Urim Vetumim, clearly such a war could be undertaken without consulting it even according to the Ramban.
But even if the present wars fall in that category of milchemet mitzvah, those wars are not fought to defend land, but to save lives. If ceasing the war and ceding land would minimize causalities, wouldn't it be counterproductive to fight the war? The only reason we can fight the war is to save lives, but not fighting the war would save more lives. So how could we fight the war to protect the land?
Basically my question is if the only basis for a milchemet mitzvah is saving lives, and not fighting the war (and ceding land) would save lives, why would it be prohibited to give up land under the war rationale?
I don't understand why the majority of the religious Zionist world opposes land for peace (ideologically). Let's assume for a moment that it's a virtual certainty that withdrawing from parts of the Judea and Shomron would lead to saving more lives than remaining in the territories. In other words the aggregate number of lives would be increased if Israel withdraws from land. Why can't Israel withdraw?
From what I understand the prohibition stems from "lo techanaim," which prohibits, among other things, giving non-Jews a stronghold in the land. Now I see no reason why pekuach nefesh would not trump this negative commandment, as it trumps every other positive or negative commandment save idolatry, murder and sexual promiscuity.
When I was in YU Rav Herschel Schacter used to propose a different ground. The Minchat Chinuch poses a question: why doesn't pekuach nefesh supersede the obligation to go to war? He answers that the nature of war is that lives are put at risk and therefore the obligation to go to war is greater than "v'cahi bahem." Therefore Rav Schacter argued that Israel must fight a war and assume causalities and can only cede land if they feel they won't win the war (in other words if the casualty rate is too high). That question is decided by the experts although regarding the disengagement question he argued that the decision should be made by believing Jews as a substitute for the Sanhedrin.
If I remember correctly, Chardal in the past argued that he'd only allow surrender of territory if the existence of the klal was at stake (like R' Yochanan). But what is the reasoning behind this position?
I think one could fairly argue that most of Israel's wars were in the category of milchemet mitzva. The Rambam lists the wars which fall under the category in Hilchot Melachim (5:1)
ואיזו היא מלחמת מצוה--זו מלחמת שבעה עממים, ומלחמת עמלק, ועזרת ישראל מצר שבא עליהםNowhere is there a mention of fighting a war to keep the land of Israel. In fact the Rambam does not even list the mitzvah of Yishuv Eretz Yisroel in his Sefer Hamitzvot (I know there are arguments to explain the seeming contradiction between his statements in Hilchot Melachim and his omission in the Sefer Hamizvot). The communal mitzvah to capture the land is well-supported by Ramban, but even if we construe that commandment into a support for a milchemet mitzvah, the Ramban himself requires consulting the Urim Vetumim prior to embarking on a milchemet mitzvah (he claims Yehushua was required to ask before capturing Eretz Yisroel). Since today we lack the Urim Vetumim, any war to capture the land would be prohibited.
However, it is clear that defending Israel from its enemies is a milchemet mitzvah that even the Ramban would not require permission from the Urim Vetumim. Rabbi J. David Bleich in the third volume of Contemporary Halachic Problems mentions that the Gemara in Eruvin 45a allows defending border towns in Israel even on Shabbos. He argues that since at the time of the Gemara, Israel had no access to the Urim Vetumim, clearly such a war could be undertaken without consulting it even according to the Ramban.
But even if the present wars fall in that category of milchemet mitzvah, those wars are not fought to defend land, but to save lives. If ceasing the war and ceding land would minimize causalities, wouldn't it be counterproductive to fight the war? The only reason we can fight the war is to save lives, but not fighting the war would save more lives. So how could we fight the war to protect the land?
Basically my question is if the only basis for a milchemet mitzvah is saving lives, and not fighting the war (and ceding land) would save lives, why would it be prohibited to give up land under the war rationale?
As Funny As It Gets
Tuesday, August 08, 2006
Take A Second And Think About It
I've seen people acting absentmindedly and then, well, I saw this. I was in the car with Shifra this past Sunday and we pulled up next to this girl driving her car. We were stopped at a red light, and she was drinking a Sprite.
I look over and noticed that she's shaking the Sprite. Not just mildly, but shaking it like an orange juice. I turn to Shifra sand say, "hey, she's shaking her Sprite." Shifra says, "well I guess she doesn't like the carbonation."
Next thing we see she opens the Sprite and it gushes out all over her. Unbelievable. I mean come on, what could she possibly be thinking?
I look over and noticed that she's shaking the Sprite. Not just mildly, but shaking it like an orange juice. I turn to Shifra sand say, "hey, she's shaking her Sprite." Shifra says, "well I guess she doesn't like the carbonation."
Next thing we see she opens the Sprite and it gushes out all over her. Unbelievable. I mean come on, what could she possibly be thinking?
Friday, August 04, 2006
Is That All There Is To It?
Yesterday I watched a kiruv video at Adereth El (one of the oldest shuls in the country). It was a good way to kill a few hours, although the lack of air conditioning made the fast a little less tolerable.
Now, normally I would have spent the entire video making fun of it, but I chose not to do so for two reasons: 1) Shifra hates that and 2) it was Tisha B'Av and I felt bad bashing a kiruv video on the day when ahavat chinum is supposed to be a theme. But there were some points where I just couldn't control myself.
Now don't get me wrong, I'm all for kiruv and think it's a good and important idea. It's just that the video made the people who became frum look stupid, ignorant, or childish.
One guy from Aish HaTorah spoke about how he used to have parties that were so crazy that the police used to send helicopters to break them up. Well obviously that sounds a little unlikely, but I'll let it go.
Long story short, the guy ends up in Israel and decides to show the Yeshiva guys that they're wrong. Being philosophically educated on the "street" he starts to debate them when one guy makes a striking point: if there's no G-d and everyone can make their own morality, then was Hitler wrong? Well the guy was sure Hitler was wrong and that got him started on a path to Orthodoxy.
It's great this guy is Orthodox, but come on, does that really work on normal people? Why can't Hitler be wrong and morality be entirely subjective? Or why can't morality be absolute and G-d not be its origin? There are so many other possibilities besides everyone is right or only G-d decides morality.
Another person was drawn in by the experience of seeing people pray fervently. They were genuine and that struck him. Are Orthodox Jews the only people who are genuine? Tom Cruise seems genuine. I'm pretty sure the Dali Lama is genuine. Most cult members are genuine. So why choose Orthodoxy?
Are people really drawn in by Discovery? Really? I mean people who aren't teenagers. Do these arguments work for most people?
Now, normally I would have spent the entire video making fun of it, but I chose not to do so for two reasons: 1) Shifra hates that and 2) it was Tisha B'Av and I felt bad bashing a kiruv video on the day when ahavat chinum is supposed to be a theme. But there were some points where I just couldn't control myself.
Now don't get me wrong, I'm all for kiruv and think it's a good and important idea. It's just that the video made the people who became frum look stupid, ignorant, or childish.
One guy from Aish HaTorah spoke about how he used to have parties that were so crazy that the police used to send helicopters to break them up. Well obviously that sounds a little unlikely, but I'll let it go.
Long story short, the guy ends up in Israel and decides to show the Yeshiva guys that they're wrong. Being philosophically educated on the "street" he starts to debate them when one guy makes a striking point: if there's no G-d and everyone can make their own morality, then was Hitler wrong? Well the guy was sure Hitler was wrong and that got him started on a path to Orthodoxy.
It's great this guy is Orthodox, but come on, does that really work on normal people? Why can't Hitler be wrong and morality be entirely subjective? Or why can't morality be absolute and G-d not be its origin? There are so many other possibilities besides everyone is right or only G-d decides morality.
Another person was drawn in by the experience of seeing people pray fervently. They were genuine and that struck him. Are Orthodox Jews the only people who are genuine? Tom Cruise seems genuine. I'm pretty sure the Dali Lama is genuine. Most cult members are genuine. So why choose Orthodoxy?
Are people really drawn in by Discovery? Really? I mean people who aren't teenagers. Do these arguments work for most people?
Saturday, July 29, 2006
Just For The 9 Days
Chardal, in a comment on DB's blog, stated:
One thing I have learned is that you can argue with DovBear on almost everything (and he is so often wrong ), but I NEVER dare debate him on the history of Christian Europe - it is far too pointless.I made a negative comment, which I shouldn't have done, so in response and in the spirit of the 9 days I'm starting a meme that lists 5 bloggers and what subjects in which I think they're especially knowledgeable:
- Dovbear -- History of Christian Europe
- Chardal -- Halachos pertaining to Religious Zionist issues (king, state, war, etc.)
- Mississippi Fred MacDowell (a.k.a. -- S.) -- Biblical studies
- Moishe Potemkin -- Economics
- Gil Student -- Slifkin-related issues
I'm tagging the five bloggers above (although I doubt any of them read my blog) and Romach, Orthomom and the rest of the Jajc crew.
Thursday, July 27, 2006
Just A Thought
Imagine if Sharon was still Prime Minister. Would things be different? I can't imagine world opinion being as supportive of Israel as it is if Sharon was leading this counterattack. Would anyone be shocked to see the Guardian with a headline along of the lines of "The Butcher is Back"?
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
Still On A Blogging Hiatus
I know I said I'm back, but finding time for blogging has still been tough. Luckily we're getting DSL in our apartment so I hope to be able to start blogging again on regular basis by next week. Until then a few points:
1) I've yet to comment on the situation in Israel and at this point there is little to add. Richard Posner has a good post on the usefulness of collective punishment (which he only assumes Israel is doing for the sake of argument). I find his argument convincing and in fact it applies to the situation at hand. I do not support intentionally targeting civilians, but I do support retaliating against terrorists who use civilians as human shields. It's sad, but the moral culpability lies with the terrorists, not the IDF.
2) I get this quasi-cable in my apartment and was watching Loose Change this morning until the station cut it off when the United 93 section started. It was playing on one of these weird "we'll show anything" stations, so don't assume a government conspiracy to cover up the fact that United 93 really landed in Cleveland. Screw Loose Change has a subtitled version of video and Salon (unsurprisingly) ripped it to pieces.
The truth is this "documentary" is really good on first glance, but the best part is the music in the background. I'm not kidding. The music really draws you in. Watch it and you'll see.
I turned in late and only got to see the World Trade Center section, which the makers of Loose Change allege were destroyed by bombs detonated by remote control in order to steal 160 billions of dollars in the basement. If you ask me there has to be an easier way of doing that than blowing up the buildings, but hey who asked me anyway?
The most obvious problem in my mind was that the buildings were really strong -- the movie makes a big deal about how powerful the buildings really were in order to show that a fire couldn't have brought them down -- and would have required tons of explosives to bring down. Where could the perpetrators have hidden the bombs? We're not talking about three sticks of dynamite here. That's a lot of explosive material. Where was it all hidden?
Like all conspiracy theories Loose Change presents a false picture, hanging its wildly tenuous theory on small pieces of evidence or minute, almost insignificant, questions that haven't been answered. I don't think we should take it too seriously just because it has a cool soundtrack.
3) The American League killed the National League in interleague play. Was it a result of the alleged AL advantage? I don't think so.
4) Can someone explain the point of drying dishes at night and putting them away instead of waiting until they dry in the morning and then putting them away? Seems like a waste of time to me.
1) I've yet to comment on the situation in Israel and at this point there is little to add. Richard Posner has a good post on the usefulness of collective punishment (which he only assumes Israel is doing for the sake of argument). I find his argument convincing and in fact it applies to the situation at hand. I do not support intentionally targeting civilians, but I do support retaliating against terrorists who use civilians as human shields. It's sad, but the moral culpability lies with the terrorists, not the IDF.
2) I get this quasi-cable in my apartment and was watching Loose Change this morning until the station cut it off when the United 93 section started. It was playing on one of these weird "we'll show anything" stations, so don't assume a government conspiracy to cover up the fact that United 93 really landed in Cleveland. Screw Loose Change has a subtitled version of video and Salon (unsurprisingly) ripped it to pieces.
The truth is this "documentary" is really good on first glance, but the best part is the music in the background. I'm not kidding. The music really draws you in. Watch it and you'll see.
I turned in late and only got to see the World Trade Center section, which the makers of Loose Change allege were destroyed by bombs detonated by remote control in order to steal 160 billions of dollars in the basement. If you ask me there has to be an easier way of doing that than blowing up the buildings, but hey who asked me anyway?
The most obvious problem in my mind was that the buildings were really strong -- the movie makes a big deal about how powerful the buildings really were in order to show that a fire couldn't have brought them down -- and would have required tons of explosives to bring down. Where could the perpetrators have hidden the bombs? We're not talking about three sticks of dynamite here. That's a lot of explosive material. Where was it all hidden?
Like all conspiracy theories Loose Change presents a false picture, hanging its wildly tenuous theory on small pieces of evidence or minute, almost insignificant, questions that haven't been answered. I don't think we should take it too seriously just because it has a cool soundtrack.
3) The American League killed the National League in interleague play. Was it a result of the alleged AL advantage? I don't think so.
4) Can someone explain the point of drying dishes at night and putting them away instead of waiting until they dry in the morning and then putting them away? Seems like a waste of time to me.
Thursday, July 13, 2006
I'm Back (For The Time Being)
OK so I finally have some time to blog. So here's the rundown.
1) My wedding was awesome and thanks for all the mazel tovs. I was sore for almost a week, but it was so worth it.
2) Married life is much better than single life, but also much harder. We have so many gifts (thank G-d) but it takes so much time to put them away, tovel them, etc. Girls also seem to care about the apartment being clean and organized and that takes time as well. I did three loads of laundry this week. Three loads!
3) Sheva brochos are very tiring and really get old very quickly. Can't say I dislike getting a free meal, but do I really have to get dressed up for it every night?
4) I haven't had much internet access, so I missed out on blogging about Hamdan and the NY Court of Appeals gay marriage decision. I still haven't read Hamdan so I can't comment on whether it was a good decision; but I have read enough about the same-sex marriage decision to say it was right on the mark. I hope to blog about it here or on JAJC.
1) My wedding was awesome and thanks for all the mazel tovs. I was sore for almost a week, but it was so worth it.
2) Married life is much better than single life, but also much harder. We have so many gifts (thank G-d) but it takes so much time to put them away, tovel them, etc. Girls also seem to care about the apartment being clean and organized and that takes time as well. I did three loads of laundry this week. Three loads!
3) Sheva brochos are very tiring and really get old very quickly. Can't say I dislike getting a free meal, but do I really have to get dressed up for it every night?
4) I haven't had much internet access, so I missed out on blogging about Hamdan and the NY Court of Appeals gay marriage decision. I still haven't read Hamdan so I can't comment on whether it was a good decision; but I have read enough about the same-sex marriage decision to say it was right on the mark. I hope to blog about it here or on JAJC.
Tuesday, July 04, 2006
Thursday, June 29, 2006
What The Hell?
CNN has reported that "Settler" Eliyahu Asheri was found today after being "abducted by Palestinian militants last weekend."
First of all who cares where he comes from or whether he's a settler? He was an 18 year old kid who was shot in the back of the head, point blank. And what exactly will it take for CNN to call someone a terrorist? They shot an unarmed person in the back of the head.
I rarely talk about media bias. But the terminology used in this article is making me sick.
But we have one piece of good news:
I wouldn't have it any other way.
First of all who cares where he comes from or whether he's a settler? He was an 18 year old kid who was shot in the back of the head, point blank. And what exactly will it take for CNN to call someone a terrorist? They shot an unarmed person in the back of the head.
I rarely talk about media bias. But the terminology used in this article is making me sick.
But we have one piece of good news:
But Palestinian militant leaders vowed that Israel's incursion into Gaza would succeed only "over our dead bodies."
I wouldn't have it any other way.
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
Why Argue?
BTW I'm blogging over at DB this week so blogging will be a little slow. I'm also getting married on Sunday so preps are taking some time also.
Lakewood Yid, on GH's blog, argued that Jews are internally superior to non-Jews. In the comments he got bashed as someone who is skewing the sources to show we don't have to respect non-Jews behind their backs.
GH correctly pointed out (in my experience) that Yid's argument is normative Chareidi ideology. So if that's true, can we disagree with him?
Maybe, but only on our assumptions. As Richard Posner persuasively argues, our moral views are heavily influenced by our intuitions, which are in turn reflective our upbringing, experiences, study, etc. Most moral arguments are merely justifications for those beliefs and many people do not have common ground to make arguments.
So Lakewood Yid, like most of the Chareidi world, lives a sheltered existence and are imbued with the racism of our ancestors (who justifiably didn't like their non-Jewish persecutors). The children are raised in this atmosphere. Those of us who are more worldly know way too many good non-Jews to be racist. We raise our children that way.
So what it comes down to is that our moral views influence how we interpret the text. Sure, the texts could be read in support or opposition or Jewish superiority (or even neutral), but how we interpret that text is going to affected by our intuitions. As DB likes to say, interpretation is an act of bias (he takes this argument too far, but that's a post for JAJC).
Lakewood Yid is going to read the text the way he wants to, and we're going to read it the way we want it to be interpreted. So why waste our time arguing with him? Sure some random guy might stumble across his statement and start hating Jews, but that's pretty unlikely. And even if that might happen, a simple statement disagreeing with his position would suffice to negate any negative effects. So why do people waste their time arguing?
I think it has to do with a lack of religious self-confidence. Lakewood Yid knows he's right and we're wrong. Most of the Chareidi world never spends any time at all focusing on Modern Orthodox arguments (unless they want to bash them) because they are sure they are faulty and contrary to "Torah True" Judaism. The Modern Orthodox world always seems to feel the need to show it's as good as Chareidi Judaism. We need to stop wasting our time focusing on the Chareidi world and start showing why Modern Orthodoxy is not just a "be'dieved," but is an equally viable strain of Orthodoxy.
Lakewood Yid, on GH's blog, argued that Jews are internally superior to non-Jews. In the comments he got bashed as someone who is skewing the sources to show we don't have to respect non-Jews behind their backs.
GH correctly pointed out (in my experience) that Yid's argument is normative Chareidi ideology. So if that's true, can we disagree with him?
Maybe, but only on our assumptions. As Richard Posner persuasively argues, our moral views are heavily influenced by our intuitions, which are in turn reflective our upbringing, experiences, study, etc. Most moral arguments are merely justifications for those beliefs and many people do not have common ground to make arguments.
So Lakewood Yid, like most of the Chareidi world, lives a sheltered existence and are imbued with the racism of our ancestors (who justifiably didn't like their non-Jewish persecutors). The children are raised in this atmosphere. Those of us who are more worldly know way too many good non-Jews to be racist. We raise our children that way.
So what it comes down to is that our moral views influence how we interpret the text. Sure, the texts could be read in support or opposition or Jewish superiority (or even neutral), but how we interpret that text is going to affected by our intuitions. As DB likes to say, interpretation is an act of bias (he takes this argument too far, but that's a post for JAJC).
Lakewood Yid is going to read the text the way he wants to, and we're going to read it the way we want it to be interpreted. So why waste our time arguing with him? Sure some random guy might stumble across his statement and start hating Jews, but that's pretty unlikely. And even if that might happen, a simple statement disagreeing with his position would suffice to negate any negative effects. So why do people waste their time arguing?
I think it has to do with a lack of religious self-confidence. Lakewood Yid knows he's right and we're wrong. Most of the Chareidi world never spends any time at all focusing on Modern Orthodox arguments (unless they want to bash them) because they are sure they are faulty and contrary to "Torah True" Judaism. The Modern Orthodox world always seems to feel the need to show it's as good as Chareidi Judaism. We need to stop wasting our time focusing on the Chareidi world and start showing why Modern Orthodoxy is not just a "be'dieved," but is an equally viable strain of Orthodoxy.
Monday, June 19, 2006
More on Interleague Play
In an earlier post, I explained why the American League might have some advantages in interleague play but that they basically even out. In this post I'll explain why, expanding on a point I made in that post. The argument that the AL benefits from interleague play alleges a systemic advantage. The system of interleague play, due to the DH rule, affords the AL advantages because they can play a slugger in the AL park, but are only brought down to the National League team’s level in the NL park. As a response I argued that the NL has advantages as well:
Let's use a video game metaphor. Assume two leagues, each league containing teams that have a 25 man roster. All the teams have 25 players who are exactly average (and therefore exactly the same). Each team is given 100 points from which it can add to the players. So, for example, a team might add 10 points to their first baseman, which would give them an excellent first baseman, but they would only be left with 90 points to spread around the rest of the team.
Depending on the league rules, the teams will allocate the points in different ways. So if one league allows its second basemen to have four strikes, each team in that league will probably allocate more points to their second basemen than the teams in the other league. In real life, one league allows the DH and the other does not. So we would assume that the teams in the AL, which allows the DH would allocate more points to a 9th hitter than in the NL.
The NL team, it would be expected, would spread out the points among the other players. But when it comes down to it, the NL and AL teams are exactly even, although their talent is spread differently among the players.
If we follow the rules of interleague play, when the teams from different leagues play each other, the away team will always be at a disadvantage. When the NL team plays in the AL stadium, the rules are tilted in favor of the team that allocated more points for a ninth hitter. When the NL team is home, it has an advantage because the AL team is constructed for a league where a ninth hitter is meaningful; in the NL having an above average ninth hitter is not helpful if it means the rest of the team will be worse off (because if that was the case, then the NL teams would just spend as much points on the ninth hitter as the AL teams).
In other words, assuming everything else is equal (and if everything else is not equal that’s not an argument against interleague play but for fixing the inequalities), interleague play does not create disadvantages for either league as long as both leagues have an equal number of home games.
1) Assuming team payrolls are basically even across leagues (excluding the Yankees who are an outlier), the AL team is at a disadvantage. Let's say bothLet me expand on this point. Let's assume that on average NL and AL teams have about the same payrolls (interestingly if one takes the Yankees out of the equation the average payrolls are almost exactly the same -- $74,923,614.3 for the AL and $74,954,351.25 for the NL). Of course even if the salaries were not equal, that would not be an argument against interleague play but against salary inequity, which is a problem in intraleague play as well.
the AL and NL team has 100 dollars to spend. If the AL team has a DH they will be forced to spend x number of dollars on the player who is playing the DH's natural position (Player Y). The NL team can spend the x dollars on other positions. So while the AL team will have a good hitter on the bench in NL parks (because Player Y won't start), the NL bench and bullpen (or other positions) will be better because they can spread that money out on the other positions. And when there's no DH, it's more important to have a deep bench and bullpen, because if it wasn't, NL teams would just spend x dollars on one slugger to keep on the bench. So the NL team will have the advantage here.
Let's use a video game metaphor. Assume two leagues, each league containing teams that have a 25 man roster. All the teams have 25 players who are exactly average (and therefore exactly the same). Each team is given 100 points from which it can add to the players. So, for example, a team might add 10 points to their first baseman, which would give them an excellent first baseman, but they would only be left with 90 points to spread around the rest of the team.
Depending on the league rules, the teams will allocate the points in different ways. So if one league allows its second basemen to have four strikes, each team in that league will probably allocate more points to their second basemen than the teams in the other league. In real life, one league allows the DH and the other does not. So we would assume that the teams in the AL, which allows the DH would allocate more points to a 9th hitter than in the NL.
The NL team, it would be expected, would spread out the points among the other players. But when it comes down to it, the NL and AL teams are exactly even, although their talent is spread differently among the players.
If we follow the rules of interleague play, when the teams from different leagues play each other, the away team will always be at a disadvantage. When the NL team plays in the AL stadium, the rules are tilted in favor of the team that allocated more points for a ninth hitter. When the NL team is home, it has an advantage because the AL team is constructed for a league where a ninth hitter is meaningful; in the NL having an above average ninth hitter is not helpful if it means the rest of the team will be worse off (because if that was the case, then the NL teams would just spend as much points on the ninth hitter as the AL teams).
In other words, assuming everything else is equal (and if everything else is not equal that’s not an argument against interleague play but for fixing the inequalities), interleague play does not create disadvantages for either league as long as both leagues have an equal number of home games.
Friday, June 16, 2006
Does Interleague Play Benefit American League Teams?
With interleague play about to start in earnest, I've decided to take a look into whether AL teams unfairly benefit from interleague play over NL teams. Why would that be the case? Some argue that although both the AL and NL has an equal number of home games in interleague play, the AL has a bigger advantage because of the DH rule.
When games are played in AL parks, both teams get to use the DH. But the AL teams usually have a strong hitter playing that position while the NL teams will usually take their best bench player, who is generally not in the same class. But when the teams play in a NL park, the AL team will usually play its DH in the field and that will level the playing field, since now both teams can only use its eight best hitters and the top eight hitters are usually fairly equal across the leagues.
So for example, when the Red Sox play the Mets in Fenway Park they have the advantage of playing David Ortiz, while the Mets will probably DH Julio Franco. That's a huge difference. But when they play in Shea Stadium, Ortiz plays the field, like Carlos Delgado, and everything is fair.
I believe the AL does have an advantage, but it's not as big as people make it out to be. The above argument is overstated because the comparison is not between Franco and Ortiz but between Franco and Kevin Youkilis (the Sox's first basemen). Youkilis is the guy who is playing Ortiz's natural position because Ortiz can DH (let's call him Youkilis Player Y). If the Red Sox played in the NL, they would play Ortiz at first and probably not have Youkilis on the roster. So the advantage the Sox have in interleague play is Youkilis's bat vs. Franco's, not Ortiz vs. Franco.
Another advantage is defense. Players DH because they are a worse defensive player than whoever is playing their natural position (Player Y). If that wasn't true, they would be playing the field and Player Y would be DHing. Ortiz plays DH because he's a worse fielder than Youkilis. Same thing with Giambi and Andy Phillips. However, this advantage is illusory because the NL team will also play their better defensive player in the field and DH the other player. So the Mets might play Franco at first and DH Carlos Delgado in Fenway, which will negate the fielding advantage. So the AL's advantage is basically the difference between the best bench player on the NL team and Player Y (in our example between Franco and Youkilis).
That gap is not that large. Moreover, the NL does have advantages in their ballparks:
1) Assuming team payrolls are basically even across leagues (excluding the Yankees who are an outlier), the AL team is at a disadvantage. Let's say both the AL and NL team has 100 dollars to spend. If the AL team has a DH they will be forced to spend x number of dollars on the player who is playing the DH's natural position (Player Y). The NL team can spend the x dollars on other positions. So while the AL team will have a good hitter on the bench in NL parks (because Player Y won't start), the NL bench and bullpen (or other positions) will be better because they can spread that money out on the other positions. And when there's no DH, it's more important to have a deep bench and bullpen, because if it wasn't, NL teams would just spend x dollars on one slugger to keep on the bench. So the NL team will have the advantage here.
2) The DH in the AL will often play DH most of the season (and when he doesn't he's probably not that much better than the NL team's best bench player). But when he is forced to play the field in NL ballparks, he is at a disadvantage because he is not used to playing the field. If Ortiz played 162 games at first base, he'd be a better first basemen than he is now (when he only plays around 20 games a year in the field). If Ortiz played in the NL, he'd be a better fielder. Practice makes a player better. So even if the NL team has a bad player playing first, he'll likely be better than Ortiz simply because he plays more. And that's a disadvantage for the AL team.
3) On the same note, pitchers will probably be better hitters and bunters in the NL because they get more practice. While the disparity won't be great (pitchers suck in both leagues), this is still a small advantage for the NL teams.
Are these disadvantages outweighed by the AL's ability to have a better hitter in AL parks? That's an empirical question, but I'm too lazy to run the numbers right now. But I think the advantage is minimal at best.
By the way, interleague play has been pretty even. As of today the NL has 1,126 wins while the AL has 1,116 wins.
When games are played in AL parks, both teams get to use the DH. But the AL teams usually have a strong hitter playing that position while the NL teams will usually take their best bench player, who is generally not in the same class. But when the teams play in a NL park, the AL team will usually play its DH in the field and that will level the playing field, since now both teams can only use its eight best hitters and the top eight hitters are usually fairly equal across the leagues.
So for example, when the Red Sox play the Mets in Fenway Park they have the advantage of playing David Ortiz, while the Mets will probably DH Julio Franco. That's a huge difference. But when they play in Shea Stadium, Ortiz plays the field, like Carlos Delgado, and everything is fair.
I believe the AL does have an advantage, but it's not as big as people make it out to be. The above argument is overstated because the comparison is not between Franco and Ortiz but between Franco and Kevin Youkilis (the Sox's first basemen). Youkilis is the guy who is playing Ortiz's natural position because Ortiz can DH (let's call him Youkilis Player Y). If the Red Sox played in the NL, they would play Ortiz at first and probably not have Youkilis on the roster. So the advantage the Sox have in interleague play is Youkilis's bat vs. Franco's, not Ortiz vs. Franco.
Another advantage is defense. Players DH because they are a worse defensive player than whoever is playing their natural position (Player Y). If that wasn't true, they would be playing the field and Player Y would be DHing. Ortiz plays DH because he's a worse fielder than Youkilis. Same thing with Giambi and Andy Phillips. However, this advantage is illusory because the NL team will also play their better defensive player in the field and DH the other player. So the Mets might play Franco at first and DH Carlos Delgado in Fenway, which will negate the fielding advantage. So the AL's advantage is basically the difference between the best bench player on the NL team and Player Y (in our example between Franco and Youkilis).
That gap is not that large. Moreover, the NL does have advantages in their ballparks:
1) Assuming team payrolls are basically even across leagues (excluding the Yankees who are an outlier), the AL team is at a disadvantage. Let's say both the AL and NL team has 100 dollars to spend. If the AL team has a DH they will be forced to spend x number of dollars on the player who is playing the DH's natural position (Player Y). The NL team can spend the x dollars on other positions. So while the AL team will have a good hitter on the bench in NL parks (because Player Y won't start), the NL bench and bullpen (or other positions) will be better because they can spread that money out on the other positions. And when there's no DH, it's more important to have a deep bench and bullpen, because if it wasn't, NL teams would just spend x dollars on one slugger to keep on the bench. So the NL team will have the advantage here.
2) The DH in the AL will often play DH most of the season (and when he doesn't he's probably not that much better than the NL team's best bench player). But when he is forced to play the field in NL ballparks, he is at a disadvantage because he is not used to playing the field. If Ortiz played 162 games at first base, he'd be a better first basemen than he is now (when he only plays around 20 games a year in the field). If Ortiz played in the NL, he'd be a better fielder. Practice makes a player better. So even if the NL team has a bad player playing first, he'll likely be better than Ortiz simply because he plays more. And that's a disadvantage for the AL team.
3) On the same note, pitchers will probably be better hitters and bunters in the NL because they get more practice. While the disparity won't be great (pitchers suck in both leagues), this is still a small advantage for the NL teams.
Are these disadvantages outweighed by the AL's ability to have a better hitter in AL parks? That's an empirical question, but I'm too lazy to run the numbers right now. But I think the advantage is minimal at best.
By the way, interleague play has been pretty even. As of today the NL has 1,126 wins while the AL has 1,116 wins.
Thursday, June 15, 2006
Extortion Alright
Harry the Centrist has a post about guys demanding money upfront in order to marry the girl. The father of the girl sold his life insurance policy so he could promise a few hundred dollars a month. I've posted about this before.
Why is it considered ok in Yeshiva world for guys to marry girls in order that they can sit and learn? Since when do people choose a wife based on how much money they can get? This isn't a hashkafic disagreement. The girl just doesn't have rich parents who can bankroll the guy. How in the world can a society promote a system where girls are accepted or rejected based on how much money her father has?
Why is it considered ok in Yeshiva world for guys to marry girls in order that they can sit and learn? Since when do people choose a wife based on how much money they can get? This isn't a hashkafic disagreement. The girl just doesn't have rich parents who can bankroll the guy. How in the world can a society promote a system where girls are accepted or rejected based on how much money her father has?
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
What Does a Guy Have To Do To Get a Yes?
I've been having an argument about what constitutes consent between two consenting adults who are engaging in a not-so-frum activity. No, I'm not talking about sex, but something along those lines. The issue is a guy who goes out on shidduch dates with shomer negiah girls and then gets a little too friendly.
What exactly is consent in that case? Let's say the guy kisses the girl and then moves in for some more "action" and the girl says nothing. Has she consented? If the answer is no, then the only possible mechanism to convey consent is a question followed by an explicit yes on her part. In other words he has to ask first, and she must unambiguously answer yes.
My friends (who initially started off disagreeing but now their opinions have seemed to converge) are arguing that the guy must ask and the girl must say yes. Is that realistic? Do guys really ask before they kiss the girl? Do they ask before they take each successive step? I have no experience here, but anecdotal evidence seems to argue against guys asking. Personally I think the guy should interpret the signals and if she never intended for the guy to kiss her, she can always say no.
Why must the guy ask? They argue that once he starts doing something the girl is too scared and surprised to do anything about it. She can't say no. What exactly is she scared of? I would have to assume she's scared of the guy getting angry and having his way anyway, this time by using physical force. So her choice is either the guy getting his action without causing her pain or the guy hurting her and still doing what he wants.
But is that really the situation? If a girl says no, would most guys really do it anyway? I highly doubt that. Only in a Feminist fantasyland are all men potential rapists and all guys completely dismissive of women's desires.
And who says the girl can't say no? Doesn't "no mean no?" Didn't Feminists fight to make sure that when a woman says no, we have to respect that? Clearly women can say no, even once the guy started (if "no means no" is referring to the girl saying no after being asked, well, that seems kind of obvious. If no didn't mean no then, what exactly would be rape?)
I think part of the problem here is that Feminists have convinced women that all men are possible rapists and if you set them off, they’ll do it. So women are justifiably scared of angering guys by saying no. We need to better educate women that most men won’t rape them and that they can say no. Because for most men, no really does mean stop.
What exactly is consent in that case? Let's say the guy kisses the girl and then moves in for some more "action" and the girl says nothing. Has she consented? If the answer is no, then the only possible mechanism to convey consent is a question followed by an explicit yes on her part. In other words he has to ask first, and she must unambiguously answer yes.
My friends (who initially started off disagreeing but now their opinions have seemed to converge) are arguing that the guy must ask and the girl must say yes. Is that realistic? Do guys really ask before they kiss the girl? Do they ask before they take each successive step? I have no experience here, but anecdotal evidence seems to argue against guys asking. Personally I think the guy should interpret the signals and if she never intended for the guy to kiss her, she can always say no.
Why must the guy ask? They argue that once he starts doing something the girl is too scared and surprised to do anything about it. She can't say no. What exactly is she scared of? I would have to assume she's scared of the guy getting angry and having his way anyway, this time by using physical force. So her choice is either the guy getting his action without causing her pain or the guy hurting her and still doing what he wants.
But is that really the situation? If a girl says no, would most guys really do it anyway? I highly doubt that. Only in a Feminist fantasyland are all men potential rapists and all guys completely dismissive of women's desires.
And who says the girl can't say no? Doesn't "no mean no?" Didn't Feminists fight to make sure that when a woman says no, we have to respect that? Clearly women can say no, even once the guy started (if "no means no" is referring to the girl saying no after being asked, well, that seems kind of obvious. If no didn't mean no then, what exactly would be rape?)
I think part of the problem here is that Feminists have convinced women that all men are possible rapists and if you set them off, they’ll do it. So women are justifiably scared of angering guys by saying no. We need to better educate women that most men won’t rape them and that they can say no. Because for most men, no really does mean stop.
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